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Abstract
We conducted an observational study to document student misconceptions about cybersecurity using
thematic analysis of 25 think-aloud interviews. By understanding patterns in student misconceptions, we
provide a basis for developing rigorous evidence-based recommendations for improving teaching and
assessment methods in cybersecurity and inform future research. This study is the first to explore student
cognition and reasoning about cybersecurity. We interviewed students from three diverse institutions. During
these interviews, students grappled with security scenarios designed to probe their understanding of
cybersecurity, especially adversarial thinking. We analyzed student statements using a structured qualitative
method, novice-led paired thematic analysis, to document patterns in student misconceptions and
problematic reasoning that transcend institutions, scenarios, or demographics. Themes generated from this
analysis describe a taxonomy of misconceptions but not their causes or remedies. Four themes emerged:
overgeneralizations, conflated concepts, biases, and incorrect assumptions. Together, these themes reveal that
students generally failed to grasp the complexity and subtlety of possible vulnerabilities, threats, risks, and
mitigations, suggesting a need for instructional methods that engage students in reasoning about complex
scenarios with an adversarial mindset. These findings can guide teachers’ attention during instruction and
inform the development of cybersecurity assessment tools that enable cross-institutional assessments that
measure the effectiveness of pedagogies.
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As educators struggle to meet the growing demand for cybersecurity professionals 
(Frost & Sullivan 2015; Libicki, Senty, & Pollak, 2014), there is a corresponding 
awareness that we lack a rigorous research base that informs how to educate the 
workforce. There have been calls to develop rigorous assessment tools to measure 
how teaching practices help students learn cybersecurity (Burley, et al., 2014). In 
response to these calls, we initiated the Cybersecurity Assessment Tools (CATS) 
project (Sherman et al., 2017a). In this paper, we present a critical early step in 
creating rigorous assessment tools: documenting how students reason about 
cybersecurity concepts. No formal study previously explored student cognition 
and reasoning about cybersecurity.  
Cybersecurity lies at the confluence of several disciplines, including computer 
science, engineering, information systems, networks, cryptography, human 
factors, and policy. Cybersecurity is an evolving field with new concepts and 
methods invented on an ongoing basis. Consequently, cybersecurity is a 
conceptually complex discipline with many facets and perspectives. As for any 
complex discipline, identifying a core conceptual framework can guide and 
inform studies about how students learn to think within the discipline. For 
example, in introductory mechanics courses, studying how students understand 
the core concept of force, alone, can provide critical insights into barriers to 
student learning (Hake, 1998; Hestenes, Wells, & Swackhamer, 1992). We 
postulate that adversarial thinking is such a core useful conceptual framework for 
reasoning about cybersecurity. Therefore, we focus our study on how students 
develop and use adversarial models to guide their reasoning about security 
scenarios and on what misconceptions students hold about fundamental 
cybersecurity concepts. 
Adversarial thinking involves reasoning about actions and goals in a context 
in which there might be bad actors attempting to defeat those goals and carry out 
their own nefarious actions (Bodeau, Fabius-Green, & Graubart, 2010; 
Caltagirone, Pendergast, & Betz, 2013; Duggan, Thomas, Veitch, & Woodard, 
2007; Mateski et al., 2012). Such reasoning requires an understanding of the goal 
requirements, as well as an understanding of who are the bad actors and what are 
their objectives, resources, access, capabilities, knowledge, motivations, and risk 
tolerance. It also requires a technical understanding of the computer systems and 
their potential vulnerabilities. Our Delphi processes revealed that adversarial 
thinking, and the associated management of trust and information in computer 
systems and networks, comprise the core concepts of cybersecurity (Parekh et al., 
2017). 
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Expanding on Scheponik et al. (2016), this paper describes our second major 
step in a four-step effort to create CATS. In fall 2014, as the first step, we carried 
out two Delphi processes to identify core cybersecurity concepts (Parekh et al., 
2017).  In the second step, we developed twelve cybersecurity scenarios based on 
the Delphi results (Sherman et al., 2017b). In 2016, we also interviewed students 
who had just completed at least one course in cybersecurity as they reasoned 
about prompts derived from the twelve scenarios to identify problematic 
reasoning patterns and misconceptions. The findings from this research will 
inform the third step, developing questions for the CATS. In the fourth step, the 
authors will validate the concept inventory using expert review, cognitive 
interviews, and psychometric testing.  
We assume that the reader is familiar with the basics of cybersecurity, 
information assurance, communications security, and cryptology, including the 
CIA triad (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) and authentication.  For an 
introduction to these concepts, see Bishop (2003); Kim & Solomon (2014); 
Schneier (1996); Sherman et al. (2017b).  
The main contribution of this paper is the analysis of student misconceptions 
about cybersecurity, leading to a taxonomy of misconceptions. The purpose of 
this study is to identify themes (or patterns) in student misconceptions and 
problematic reasonings. We do not examine the causes of, or potential remedies 
to, these student misconceptions as the causes may vary by categories or even 
particular misconceptions. Instead, we focus on documenting which categories of 
misconceptions appear across a variety of demographics, instructional methods, 
topics, concepts, and course objectives. The primary value of these overarching 
patterns is twofold: 1) the broad applicability of these categories can inform the 
design of assessment tools that should be broadly applicable and 2) all instructors 
can readily identify that students in their courses possess misconceptions or 
problematic reasonings that align with these categories, helping to guide their 
attention to students’ problems. These categories can then be used to guide more 
targeted studies that aim to explore causality and remedies of particular 
misconceptions or categories of misconceptions. 
In alignment with this purpose, we used a qualitative approach that let us 
richly describe the range of student misconceptions and reasonings to identify the 
patterns that transcended local idiosyncrasies. We sampled students from a variety 
of institutions with varying curricular goals and teaching methods. Our qualitative 
analysis methods enable richness of description and a basis for theory building to 
the domain of analysis (Borrego, Douglas, & Amelink, 2009). We begin by 
reviewing relevant background literature on student misconceptions and how 
students learn.  Next, we more fully describe our research questions and methods. 
We then present four common themes (overgeneralizations, conflated concepts, 
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biases, and incorrect solutions) that describe the commonalities in student 
reasoning across institutions, scenarios, and topics. Finally, we suggest potential 
implications of our findings on teaching practices and suggest new avenues for 
research that could be explored. Appendix A provides our interview prompts. 
BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS WORK 
In this section, we first provide a brief overview of our underlying theories of 
human cognition that guided our study design and then describe our current 
understanding of student misconceptions in cybersecurity, demonstrating the 
necessity of the current study. 
This study is grounded in constructivist theory, which asserts that humans 
construct and interpret an understanding of reality that is different from reality 
based in the physical world (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). For example, Patton (2005) 
describes the physical sun as being “real,” while the perception of the sun is not 
real in an absolute sense. The experience of looking at the sun and feeling the heat 
on the skin is real to people, but the perception of the sun is influenced by 
individual life context and culture. It is through experiencing the natural world 
that humans develop conceptions, and with them, misconceptions. For example, 
children’s misconceptions are built on their intuitive interactions with the world, 
such as believing the world is flat or that heavier objects will fall faster than 
lighter objects (Chi, 2005; Vosniadou, 2007).  
A core difference between experts and novices within a domain of knowledge 
is their ability to organize their knowledge around a core set of concepts 
(Bransford, Brown, & Cocking, 2000). While novices usually attend to the 
surface features of problems (e.g., the presence of an incline plane), experts attend 
to the deeper, abstract conceptual aspects of problems (e.g., Newton’s laws) (Chi, 
Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981). This conceptual knowledge enables experts to 
identify the important features of a problem more quickly, making them easier to 
solve, more easily transfer their knowledge to new situations, and accelerate their 
learning of new domain knowledge (Bransford, Brown, & Cocking, 2000). 
Misconceptions or a lack of conceptual knowledge hinders these critical skills. 
Experts debate the cognitive structure of misconceptions, as some appear to be 
more robust or theory-like, while others appear to be more chaotic and 
unpredictable (Chi, 2005). For example, Özdemir & Clark (2007) note that it is 
commonly believed that students hold to a naïve theory about physics that 
resembles the now rejected Impetus Theory. In contrast, in computing contexts 
student conceptions of state or implication can vary dramatically from context to 
context and from problem to problem (Herman, Loui, & Zilles, 2012; Perkins & 
Martin, 1986). This fragmentation aligns with diSessa’s Knowledge in Pieces 
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theory (diSessa, Gillespie, & Esterly, 2004). Simon (1996) argued that student 
cognition is much more fragmented in computing contexts because students must 
wrestle with the “science of the artificial” rather than with the science of the 
physical world.  
Because cybersecurity exists at the intersection of the physical and digital 
worlds, it is not immediately clear whether student understanding of cybersecurity 
concepts will be more coherent, drawing from years of experience with security 
concepts in the physical world, or incoherent, drawing from limited experiences 
with the digital world. This study begins to fill a void in the literature about the 
cognitive structure of concepts in cybersecurity.  
Regardless of the cognitive structure of novices, experts in a field are known 
to be able to access their knowledge more effectively because it is organized into 
a coherent conceptual structure. In cybersecurity, we posit that “adversarial 
thinking,” including the ability to organize a scenario into an adversarial model, is 
one such conceptual structure. 
No prior research has documented student misconceptions about cybersecurity 
concepts nor how students use adversarial models to guide their reasoning, 
necessitating careful and critical observation of patterns in students’ reasoning 
before grounded hypotheses and experimental studies can be made. The NICE 
framework (NIST, 2013) and professional certification tests, such as CISSP 
(CISSP, 2016), provide a basis for identifying standards in terminology, 
information, and notation, but they do not tell us about how students learn or 
reason about cybersecurity concepts. Similarly, the 2013 IEEE/ACM Computing 
Curriculum articulates some learning goals that institutions may want to adopt for 
their students, but this curriculum does not provide any guidance for how students 
learn those topics (Joint Task Force on Computing Curricula, 2013). 
A variety of ongoing initiatives are taking place to help meet the demand for 
cybersecurity professionals: The National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education 
(NICE) framework articulated a common lexicon for cybersecurity education and 
jobs (NIST, 2013), and the IEEE/ACM Computing Curriculum added 
cybersecurity content to the undergraduate curriculum in computing (Joint Task 
Force on Computing Curricula, 2013; ACM/IEEE/AIS/IFIP Joint Task Force, 
2017). Educators and stakeholders meet at conferences to discuss the challenges 
(e.g., the Colloquium for Information Systems Security Education (CISSE); 
National Cyber Summit; WISE; Bishop, Futcher, Miloslavskaya, & 
Theocharidou, 2017). The National Science Foundation created the CyberCorps: 
Scholarship for Service (SFS) program, and the Department of Defense created 
the Information Assurance Scholarship Program (IASP). 
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An observational study seeks to describe phenomena richly and rigorously. Our 
goal in this study is to identify patterns that transcend individual contexts yet are 
still identifiable and relatable (e.g., a taxonomy of marine animals should be 
drawn by observing animals from multiple bodies of water and generate 
descriptions that help others classify those animals). These observations can later 
be used to inform research questions that seek to examine causality or describe 
classes of phenomenon in more depth (e.g., research into how marine animals 
breathe would be confounded if whales and dolphins were incorrectly 
taxonomized as fish). Consequently, our methods focus on deeply observing the 
behaviors of a diverse group of students to identify patterns that emerge across 
that diversity. 
Subjects 
We recruited subjects (n=26), who had taken at least one course in cybersecurity 
and who ranged in experience and educational goals.  Students in targeted 
cybersecurity courses were given recruitment fliers and those who agreed to 
participate were interviewed at their home institution.  The subjects included five 
females and 21 males who ranged in experience and educational goals.  Thirty-
five percent were enrolled in a certificate program or Associates degree programs, 
24 percent were enrolled in a Bachelors degree program, 31 percent were enrolled 
in a Masters degree program and 8% were enrolled in a Doctoral degree 
program.  Ninety percent of subjects had relevant work or intern experience 
ranging from 6 months to 12 years. 
The subjects attended one of three universities: University of Maryland 
Baltimore County (UMBC) (n=12), a public research institution (UMBC); Bowie 
State University (BSU) (n=4), a Historically Black University; and Prince 
Georges Community College (PGCC) (n=9), a community college that focuses on 
vocational training and preparing students for four-year institutions. These three 
institutions force our observations to hold true across students with different 
demographics and curricula with different priorities, teaching methods, and 
learning objectives.  
The goal of sampling is to reach saturation of observations. This saturation 
occurs when additional interviews provide no new insights. This approach works 
for our study since we are concerned with the breadth of observations rather than 
their prevalence among different student demographics (e.g., gender, ethnicity). 
Previous similar studies by (Herman, Loui, & Zilles, 2011; Herman, Zilles, & 
Loui, 2012) found saturation occurred between eight and ten interviews. We can 
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determine whether saturation is reached by whether new themes emerged or were 
identified as we analyzed new interviews.  
Data Collection 
To create a diversity of observations of student knowledge across domain content, 
we developed 12 scenarios to reflect core concepts in cybersecurity identified in 
our Delphi process (Parekh et al., 2017).  We designed the scenarios to be 
authentic, relevant, concise, and engaging, and we structured the prompts to allow 
students to have freedom of response in describing their approaches and ideas. 
We organized the scenarios into three protocols (Alpha, Bravo, Charlie), with 
each protocol including scenarios embodying a range of ideas and difficulty 
levels.  Appendix A gives the interview prompts for each of our 12 scenarios and 
shows how they are organized into the three protocols. Our companion paper 
(Sherman et al., 2017b) gives exemplary responses to six of our favorite 
scenarios. 
 We presented students from a variety of institutions with four different 
cybersecurity scenarios each and interviewed each student for approximately one 
hour as they reasoned about those scenarios. We video- and audio-recorded the 26 
interviews and then analyzed them using the novice-led thematic analysis method 
(Montfort, Herman, Brown, Matusovich, & Strevler, 2013). UMBC’s Institutional 
Review Board approved the interview and analysis protocols. 
During the interviews, the interviewer read the prompt and provided it in 
written form to the subject, for some scenarios augmented with a diagram. We 
also prepared a detailed guide for the interviewer to help her respond to students 
answers that reflected any possible level of mastery.  Specifically, we structured 
this guide as a hierarchy of suggestions for dealing with “hits” (correct answers) 
and “misses” (incorrect answers). 
The lead interviewer was a professor with expertise in educational research, 
extensive experience with conducting cognitive interviews, and minimal 
experience with cybersecurity. Because interviews are a didactic process, the 
interactions between the interviewer and the student may bias the student 
responses. Since our goal was to encourage students to engage in extended 
descriptions of their thinking even if they were uncertain of the correctness of 
their answers. To minimize the likelihood that students might feel embarrassed 
about an answer or be fearful of being judged, the interviewer shared her lack of 
experience in cybersecurity with the subject at the beginning of the interview and 
reassured students that the focus of the student was not an evaluation of their 
individual performance. This method also minimized the likelihood that the 
student would try to “fish” for correct answers from the interviewer or suspect 
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that follow-up questions implied that the student gave a wrong answer. In 
classroom settings, experts often only ask follow-up questions if students 
answered a question incorrectly, so positioning the interviewer as a novice 
suggests to the student that follow-up questions are sincere requests for more 
information rather than Socratic, evaluative questions meant to highlight an error. 
While this positioning may encourage more active dialogue between the 
interviewer and interviewee, it poses a few critical limitations. First, the 
interviewer may not realize that certain nuances in student understanding need to 
be further explored. Second, the interviewee may “dumb down” their answers to 
avoid confusing the novice interviewer. To compensate for these limitations, other 
members of the research team with expertise in cybersecurity were also present 
during the interviews. These members were allowed to ask questions only when 
invited by the lead interviewer at the end of each scenario. They could follow-up 
on any answers that an expert perceived needed further exploration and engage 
students in more sophisticated dialogue that could reveal the extent of student 
knowledge. 
Each interview lasted approximately one hour. We conducted the interviews 
using a think-aloud format (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). After the subject provided 
their initial response to a scenario, the lead interviewer prompted them to provide 
more detail and explanation of their approaches. After each prompt, the lead 
interviewer allowed plenty of time for subjects to articulate their thought process 
and provide a rationale for their approaches. The prompting continued until the 
subject had no further clarification or justification for their response.  
We audio- and video-recorded the interviews, photographed notes taken by 
the students, and transcribed the audio recording (with help by undergraduate 
assistants). We then analyzed the transcriptions, audio files, and notes as 
described in the next subsection. Table 1 details the number of students receiving 
each interview protocol at each school.  
 
School Interview Protocol 
  Alpha Bravo Charlie Total 
UMBC 4 4 4 12 
PGCC 2 3 4 9 
BSU 1 1 2 4 
Total 7 8 10 25 
Table 1: Number of students interviewed by school and interview protocol. 
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Novice-Led Paired Thematic Analysis 
Three researchers analyzed the interviews using a novice-led thematic analysis 
(Montfort et al., 2013): two with expertise in the content area and one with 
relatively minimal knowledge in the content area and expertise in qualitative 
research methods. The “novice” led the analysis and learned the content while 
interpreting and analyzing the data.  Having the novice lead the analysis provides 
two primary benefits that enable richer observations and descriptions of student 
misconceptions. First, because the novice is likely to be more familiar with how 
cybersecurity concepts and terms are used in colloquial contexts, they will be 
better able to identify the conceptual and linguistic knowledge that students are 
using to build their knowledge of cybersecurity. Second, experts frequently suffer 
from what is called “expert blind-spot,” becoming so familiar with content 
knowledge that they fail to recognize when their explanations or justifications 
make assumptions a novice does not understand (Nathan, Alibali, & Koedinger, 
2005; Nathan & Petrosino, 2003). This blind-spot can be problematic when 
analyzing student responses to technical conceptual questions because the expert 
may add missing information into a question or scenario without realizing they 
are doing so. These benefits of novice-led thematic analysis enable the team to 
perceive more nuances in the data while the presence of experts on the analysis 
team ensures that findings reflect accepted disciplinary knowledge. 
In accordance with this process, the researchers familiarized themselves and 
calibrated their understandings of the data through an iterative cycle of 
independent analysis and collaborative discussion. To orient the content novice 
toward the appropriateness of student responses without overly influencing her 
interpretation, the content experts read through the interviews and labeled sections 
coarsely as either “correct” or “incorrect,” and provided a few words of 
explanation as needed. The novice began her analysis with these initial codes in 
mind. The researchers then discussed and came to a consensus on interpretations 
of each excerpt of student incorrect answers, more fully fleshing out why, in what 
ways, and to what extent responses were incorrect, and tracking interpretations in 
a spreadsheet. The process allowed the researchers, with differing perspectives, to 
challenge each other’s assumptions.  
From these interpretations, themes of misconceptions and student reasoning 
emerged. In accordance to Braun & Clarke (2006), initial patterns and themes 
focused on a subset of the data (Alpha interview responses) and then expanded to 
include the remaining two interview protocols (Bravo and Charlie). The team 
reviewed the themes based on relevance to the coded data set, defined with 
substantive examples, and checked through conversations among co-authors. 
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These steps validated and added richness and context to the themes. Because no 
new themes were identified when analyzing the Bravo and Charlie interviews, we 
believe that we indeed reached saturation of observations with our sample. 
FINDINGS 
Four themes of student misconceptions emerge from the interviews: 
overgeneralizations, conflation, biases, and incorrect assumptions (including 
limiting the adversary and failure to see vulnerabilities). We now explain each of 
these themes and illustrate them with examples. 
Theme 1:  Overgeneralization  
An overgeneralization is a type of misconception in which a person takes a 
concept that is valid in one context and inappropriately applies it to a new context. 
For example, a student who is learning decimal notation may think that 0.09 is 
greater than 0.1 because numbers with more digits are always greater, or that 9 is 
always greater than 1 (Sackur-Grisvard & Leonard, 1985; Steinle, 2004). While 
these conceptions may be true for integers or single digit integers, respectively, 
these conceptions of numbers are misconceptions when applied to decimal 
representations.  
We observed students make inappropriate generalizations about most 
technologies and security protocols that they discussed. We illustrate this 
misconception in three examples: encryption, biometrics, and the security of the 
Internet. Some other concepts students generalized include multi-factor 
authentication, passwords, security badges, security questions, text messages, 
hash functions, and man-in-the-middle attacks. 
The first example involves encryption, which is a process that mixes plaintext 
in a complicated way with a sequence of bits known as the key.  The resulting 
ciphertext looks like gibberish.  With knowledge of the key, a recipient can 
reverse the process to yield the plaintext.  If the process is secure, the adversary 
(who is not given the key) cannot recover the key or plaintext. 
Many students overgeneralize and form misconceptions by assuming that 
encryption achieves additional properties beyond confidentiality: preventing 
manipulation, protecting against theft, and ensuring availability. For example, 
when asked how encryption can support the security of a drone, a student 
incorrectly stated that encryption prevented alteration and theft of the data, in 
addition to protecting confidentiality:  
[There is] high reliability that something encrypted is going to remain 
untampered. It increases that reliability and the assurance that something that 
has not been altered or stolen or read or whatever. 
9
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The notion that encryption prevents data from being “read” is correct, since it 
focuses on confidentiality, but connecting encryption to alteration and theft is 
incorrect. Integrity is the term used to ensure that a file has not been altered. 
Integrity can be established by computing a hash−function or a Message 
Authentication Code, such as keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code, along 
with or without encryption.  It is possible that the student’s statement about 
reliability also reflects confusion between encryption and error-correcting coding. 
The second example involves biometrics, which involve authentication 
protocols that are based in human biology, such as fingerprints, DNA samples, or 
retinal scans. Students overgeneralized by considering biometrics to be a panacea 
for improving security of any system. While biometrics may increase 
authentication strength in some systems, they do not always do so. They also have 
their own weaknesses and limitations (whether ethical or practical) that need to be 
considered.  
For example, biometrics can be forged as a password can be guessed or stolen. 
However, whereas a user can change a compromised password, a user cannot 
change their compromised biometrics. Storing biometrics can also pose ethical 
dilemmas, requiring users to surrender otherwise private personal information. 
Students failed to consider these types of vulnerabilities and limitations. For 
example, when asked about increasing the security of a voting system, one student 
suggested including a DNA sample: 
Interviewer: What would that form look like? What might that method be that 
ensures that the person showing up to vote is who he or she says they are?  
Subject: Signatures and DNA testing. You can put a signature, but that may be 
referring to someone else instead. That’s why you need DNA clarification to 
ensure that it is you who is voting, not someone else. 
This student’s response is troubling because they fail to consider the 
limitations of DNA testing and they describe DNA testing with language (i.e., 
“need” and “ensure”) that implies that their suggestion is fail proof. The origin of 
this overgeneralization is unclear, whether students developed these impressions 
from media and movies or their lack of experience with forgery of biometrics. 
This misconception also emphasizes student failures to examine vulnerabilities as 
we will discuss further in Theme 4.  
The third example involves insecurities of the Internet. Some students have 
heard that the Internet has vulnerabilities, which is true, but they take this fact and 
generalize that nothing can be carried out securely on the Internet, which is 
incorrect. For example, one student stated: 
10





I don’t trust any network, anywhere, unless I am the one that controls what is 
going on. I would never do anything that is not on my own because you never 
know who is reading it. 
While the Internet has many vulnerabilities, the student’s response is 
unreasonably extreme for some applications.  For example, cryptography provides 
tools (e.g., encryption, hashing, digital signatures, virtual private networks) for 
sending messages over insecure channels with confidentiality, integrity, and 
authentication.   
This response has additional problematic aspects.  Even on a private network, 
one will likely rely on other networks to access information. There is a bias in 
believing that systems under one’s control are necessarily more secure.  For many 
situations, never using a public network would be highly inconvenient.  
Nevertheless, there is some merit to the student’s paranoia; their distrust of all 
networks has considerable validity. 
Theme 2: Conflating Concepts 
Conflation is a type of misconception in which a person treats two things that are 
different as the same. Evidence of conflation includes when a student uses names 
or words associated with a concept interchangeably. For example, in digital logic 
contexts, students frequently conflate the concepts of multiplexers and decoders, 
confusing their topological features (numbers of inputs and outputs) and their 
functions (Herman, Loui, & Zilles, 2011). Consequently, when asked to describe 
a multiplexer, some students will describe a decoder instead. Further, these 
conflations revealed that students could not articulate the purposes or functions 
that multiplexers and decoders play inside a computer.  
In our interviews, students conflated many different concepts such as integrity 
and availability, hashing and encryption, authorization and authentication, 
authentication and passwords, risk and threat, and certificate authority and 
certificate of authenticity. We present three student quotations to illustrate this 
theme.  
In the context of cybersecurity, the term threat refers to a potential violation 
of security, while risk refers to the likelihood that an adversary will exploit that 
threat coupled with the potential resulting loss (Bishop, 2003). By contrast, in 
colloquial contexts, the idea of risk denotes any dangerous situation−someone 
may state that they are putting themselves at risk if they drive without a seat belt. 
This everyday concept of risk excludes the idea of considering the likelihood of a 
threat occurring where a threat in this driving context might include a drunk 
driver. 
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When discussing the security of a drone delivering a package, a student 
conflated the everyday concept of risk with the cybersecurity concept of risk: 
Interviewer: So if you are working for FedEx, how would you design your 
drones to make sure that doesn’t happen? 
Subject: … We need to identify the risks, what all a person can do. [The 
attacker] can send illegal things, he can send drugs, and he can hack control. 
He can control to another address. Once we have identified all of the risks, we 
can create a security protocol for each of those risks.  
While the student’s reasoning might be correct in everyday conversation, the 
student’s reasoning fails because he is actually describing threats and not risks in 
formal cybersecurity rhetoric. In our analysis, we similarly identified the terms 
confidentiality and threat being used in a context true to their definitions outside 
of the cybersecurity domain, but incorrect within cybersecurity. 
A different student also conflated threat and risk, using threat to describe risk:  
If the average person has a drone for whatever purpose, they’re probably just 
playing with it for a few moments and it’s unlikely that anybody is going to 
take it from them. If it’s something that is going to be carrying anything of 
value that anyone else might want, that increases the threat.  
This student uses the term “threat” instead of the appropriate term “risk” (the 
increased value of the package increases the likelihood that an adversary would 
exploit the threat of theft). In these two quotations, students used the word “risk” 
to describe threats and the word “threat” to describe “risks.” This bidirectional 
confusion of the words to concepts reveals that students likely struggle to create 
and maintain distinctions between these two concepts. This conflation may, in 
particular, reveal a lack of adversarial thinking. While threats focus on the 
characteristics of the system being secured, risk focuses on the motivation and 
capabilities of adversaries relative to the threats of the system.  
Students also conflated passwords and authentication. A password is typically 
a string of characters used to authenticate a person in conjunction with a 
username, perhaps as part of an authorization process to gain access to a system. 
By contrast, authentication is the act of verifying who a person or entity is. We, 
for example, found that some students conflate passwords with authentication, 
perhaps because passwords are a common form of authentication. In the following 
quotation, the student identified scanning fingerprints as a type of “password,” 
instead of a form of authentication: 
You could do other forms of passwords, where you don’t want to do just 
standard text, or whatever. You can do something like biometric as a way 
to take that next step to sync it to that individual, that somebody else 
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couldn’t have access to, such as a fingerprint. It’s a fingerprint, a safer 
measure to make sure that somebody isn’t doing it—to tap into your 
personal information and access it under yourself. 
By using the term “password” to refer to the broader concept of 
authentication, the student reveals a lack of conceptual distinction between 
passwords and authentication. This type of conflation is slightly different in origin 
than the conflation of threat and risk. Rather than the conflation resulting from 
differences between colloquial and technical language, this misconception comes 
from failing to create an appropriate hierarchy of concepts and specific 
instantiations of those concepts. This type of misconception is prevalent in other 
disciplines, such as conflating speed (a scalar) and velocity (a vector whose 
magnitude is a speed) (Trowbridge & McDermott, 1980). Notably, this student’s 
statement also reflects the overgeneralization of the value of biometrics, as 
discussed in Theme 1.  
Theme 3:  Biases  
Biases can result in misconceptions when students inappropriately project their 
assumptions and beliefs on a concept. These beliefs and assumptions are often 
formed through existing mental frameworks based on life experiences. We 
identified three biases: user, physical, and personal. 
User Bias 
Prior to formal instruction in cybersecurity, students primarily experience 
cybersecurity systems as users—for example, shopping at online stores or paying 
bills through websites. During interviews, students relied heavily on these prior 
experiences to orient and guide their thought processes, creating a bias toward 
thinking about concerns of a user rather than about threats to the data system. For 
example, for a scenario in which the students imagined that they were the security 
engineer responsible for an online shopping site, students focused on issues of 
identity fraud rather than on security of the database. In response to this prompt, 
one student said: 
I think where this question is trying to go, is to see if someone is trying to 
register for the same account…to get access to their account information. 
This student reveals a concern about identity theft (a user concern), rather than 
SQL injections or denial-of-service attacks to the system. Identity theft is a valid 
concern, and the security engineer for the shopping site has a responsibility to 
protect personal information that it collects (e.g., as part of payments).  However, 
the security engineer must also address a wide range of other issues. 
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A similar example includes students arguing that a system would be secure as 
long as the latest software and patches were installed and updated, reflecting an 
emphasis on what the actions a typical user can do to try to protect their system. 
Additionally, when asked about increasing database security, some students 
focused on selecting complex passwords, an action that users can take to protect 
their data but which would not necessarily make data on the server more secure. 
These examples highlight that students tend to focus the description of security to 
the user side, likely based on their previous experiences. 
Physical Bias 
Cybersecurity requires coordination of physical and cyber systems. For example, 
there can be physical locks on a door to a room that holds a computer with 
digitally encrypted files. Both the physical locks and digital encryption are part of 
the security of the system and both can be potentially compromised. Students, 
however, demonstrated biases toward the physical elements of the systems, 
discussing them more readily, believing that they were more secure, and 
inappropriately analogizing physical systems to cyber systems. Since most of life 
is experience within a physical domain, it is not surprising that students build their 
conceptions of security based on these physical systems.  
For example, when asked about making a computer system in a hotel business 
center more secure, one student focused on the characteristics of the room and did 
not discuss cyber threats: 
Interviewer: What if the hotel has gotten a complaint because something 
insecure happened in their business office. They hired you and said, come on 
in and make our business office more secure for our guests. What are some 
things that you might be able to offer to them to make those transactions more 
secure for their guests? 
Subject: That is a very interesting question. I am saying that I am trying to 
picture the locks on most of the business rooms in the hotels. Some of them 
are very small, they are just little tiny small space there with two or three 
computers. So, when they sit there, if all of those computers are taken, those 
two or three, then everybody—somebody next to you can just see exactly 
what you are doing. So, perhaps one thing that I recommend to them is to-If 
that is the only space that they have, then maybe only have a single computer 
in that small space. 
Having a room may provide some security from a person walking behind and 
overseeing transactions; however, a key logger, camera, or malware could be on 
the machine, and the physical system might not address those issues. When asked 
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to consider interventions beyond physical ones to increase security, the student 
provided only vague descriptions of “Internet security:” 
Subject: Okay, then you just wonder how they are going to secure their 
Internet, so that they make sure the security of their Internet is trusted. They 
give you this Internet facility and you use it, if your data is messed up, it is 
going to come back to them. So, make sure their Internet security is correct.  
The student recognizes that security and interventions can go beyond the 
physical systems, and he knows that the online actions need to be “secure” and 
“trusted.” However, this student did not provide evidence of understanding of 
how to create security or trust within the digital domain.  
Students demonstrated further biases toward the security of physical systems, 
asserting that human beings cannot be hacked, overestimating the strength of 
having a physical key on a system, or believing that the physical presence of a 
security engineer would be needed to remove viruses from a network. 
Additionally, students sometimes inappropriately compared the security of 
physical systems to make sense of the security of cyber systems. For example, 
one student analogized that (correctly-addressed) email messages might be 
misdelivered as postal mail is sometimes mistakenly delivered to a nearby 
building. Making analogies with physical systems (e.g., sending messages in 
locked boxes) can help students understand cybersecurity concepts, but analogies 
can be imperfect and care must be taken not to assume that a physical or cyber 
system is necessarily more secure than the other type. 
Personal Bias 
Beliefs or stereotypes about countries and cultures was an additional source of 
bias in student reasoning about cybersecurity. For example, one student’s beliefs 
about the security of file transfer depended on which country he was in:  
Let’s say I am sending a file in America itself. Then there is a good chance 
my file won’t be hacked. But let’s say I am overseas—I am going to countries 
where hacking is very common. Let’s say Syria or China, or somewhere like 
that. 
This response is incorrect for two reasons: hackers reside in the US as well as 
in other countries, and theft of data can be accomplished remotely (revealing an 
additional physical bias in the student’s reasoning). This student’s belief about 
countries and security, revealing implicit trust in certain individuals without 
verification, is likely based in personal beliefs and stereotypes. Further, this 
student’s unverified trust in individuals and systems betrays a lack of adversarial 
thinking. Nevertheless, there may be some truth to the belief that the risk of cyber 
attack to visitors is greater in some countries than others. While no other students 
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explicitly revealed similar beliefs during the interviews, this type of bias is 
important because it may support ways in which students artificially limit their 
adversaries or overlook vulnerabilities—our next theme.  
Theme 4: Incorrect Assumptions - Limiting the Adversary and 
Failure to See Vulnerabilities  
The incorrect assumptions theme focuses on the process by which students make 
assumptions about systems, technologies, or adversaries without questioning the 
basis or validity of those assumptions. These assumptions betray a lack of 
adversarial thinking as students do not adequately consider the range of possible 
motives or capabilities of their adversaries before proposing and justifying 
security measures. These incorrect assumptions and a failure to question them, led 
to a range of misconceptions and problems in student reasoning. Some examples 
that fall into this category include: students relying heavily on policies or a lack of 
knowledge rather than physical systems to deter an adversary, to assume some 
groups of people such as military personnel are all trustworthy, and that a system 
which is under attack by an adversary will exhibit detectable and anomalous 
behavior. We provide three examples of this process to illustrate the dangers of 
incorrect assumptions. 
The first example focuses on the security of a military voting system. A 
student identified one possible motive for an adversary, and failed to consider 
other motives. The proposed solution had significant vulnerabilities, including 
creating a new mechanism for an attack on the voting system: 
There should be a feature for when you enter a password, more than a certain 
number, a wrong one, it scrambles the data and makes it unusable and destroys 
[the data]. Makes the data unusable so that, in the worst-case scenario, the bad 
guy wouldn’t get any useful information out of it. 
A significant vulnerability of this proposed system is that an attacker may not 
focus on theft of the information, but rather on destruction of data. In the 
proposed solution, the attacker can intentionally choose to enter in false 
passwords to achieve their goal. This student consequently proposed a solution 
that may aid an attacker, because he assumed the attacker’s goal must be theft. 
In the second example, a student incorrectly assumed malware cannot be 
stored on keyboards or mice. Malware is a type of software intended for some 
nefarious end, such as to damage or disable a computer system, or to steal 
information.  It can impact a system instantaneously and can be loaded onto a 
computer through a variety of means, including through keyboards and mice. 
When asked how to mitigate malware from a USB port the student stated: 
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You could have an alarm or disable USB ports on the machine, but the 
problem with that is that most machines nowadays only have USB ports for 
the keyboard [and] mouse. Unlike older machines that have the older PS2 
connectors for the keyboard and mouse. You would have to be careful about 
how you are going to enable USB for the keyboard or mouse, but throw an 
alarm if it something else. It’s difficult. It’s not an easy answer. 
This answer is problematic because the student incorrectly assumed that a 
keyboard or mouse could not be used to install malware. Further, the student 
failed to consider that malware can affect a network faster than a person can 
respond to a physical alarm (another example of physical bias). This suggests that 
the student does not understand how malware can be installed onto a system, and 
the speed at which it can infect the system. This misconception resulted in 
incorrect reasoning on a proposed mitigation of a malware attack.  
In the third example, a student role-plays a penetration tester attempting to 
exfiltrate a USB stick hidden under a floor tile in a top-secret government facility. 
In response to this challenge, the student suggests a social engineering solution. 
This response would be correct by itself; however, the student limited the 
adversary and made the claim that it is impossible to break into a top-secret 
governmental building, without providing adequate evidence or defending the 
claim. As a result, the student’s solution is incorrect because the student situates 
the solution as the only possible solution.  
Subject: ... it is a top-secret government facility so there is really no way to 
break in. I can only see paying somebody off or getting somebody to get it for 
you. Really, that is the only way to get something that is that secretive, to me. 
I really don’t see another alternative of getting in there. 
Interviewer: Okay, well, think about it for a second. Think outside of the box. 
Subject: I have a question. Does Dave just leave the USB stick under there at 
all times? Does he leave it there when he leaves work, plugs it back in and 
uses it whenever he comes to work? 
Interviewer: We don’t know that. 
Subject: We don’t know that? Okay. I don’t know any of these things. First 
things first. I’m outside of the fence. Am I able to see inside the building? 
That’s a big thing. It has no window, right? It is government. Okay, that is 
eliminated. The architecture of the building—so, we know it has no windows. 
I can get some shady Russians to make me a fake identity. Get a government 
clearance with it. Work at the same building he does. Actually, the only thing 
I can think of, honestly, is to literally pay somebody off, or pay Dave off, 
himself, to bring the USB stick out to me. Oh, I am a penetration tester. I am 
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not a hacker, or anything. I honestly don’t know how to get the USB drive. I 
am really stumped on that. I really don’t know. I would have an inside man.  
Interviewer: Any other thoughts? It’s hard to do, right, because it is a secret 
government facility. 
Subject: Yeah, I don’t know how I will be able to do that. I can’t walk in 
there. It’s not like it is on the system where I could see and attack. 
Even though the proposed social-engineering attack would be plausible, the 
adversarial mindset requires a more open-minded approach. The student shows 
that they are stuck, and is trying to think through ideas, but each time they 
propose a solution, the student immediately rejects it as an option. A determined 
adversary might have substantial resources and patience. The student’s response 
is flawed because the student is constrained by the belief that there is only one 
solution.  
DISCUSSION 
The four themes of student misconceptions we identified reveal that many 
students did not understand the functional and technical components of 
cybersecurity, such as encryption, and they did not adequately consider the 
complexity of the concepts and scenarios. Adversarial thinking requires a 
reflective mindset that carefully considers not only one’s own actions but also the 
motivations, capabilities, and opportunities of adversaries who desire to harm the 
systems defenders seek to protect.  
The first theme is overgeneralizing the usefulness or applicability of one 
concept into inappropriate contexts. Overgeneralizations reveal that students 
believe that because a solution or idea was useful in one context it must have 
some general utility.  
In the second theme, students conflated two concepts into one concept. 
Conflations reveal that students do not distinguish between similar but distinct 
concepts, simplifying their understanding of cybersecurity, again revealing a lack 
of nuance in understanding the nature of problems or the limitations of solutions. 
While this type of shallow reasoning can be detrimental in any context, it is 
particularly disconcerting in cybersecurity. The adversarial mindset needed for 
cybersecurity is inherently complex, requiring consideration of multiple actors 
and systems and each of their capabilities, weaknesses, and motives, and 
considering the interactions among these myriad factors. 
The third theme reveals that biases guided and directed student engagement 
with the scenarios. For example, students frequently considered only how they 
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would act during a given situation or inappropriately analogized with familiar 
physical systems. 
In the fourth theme, students applied incorrect assumptions, often 
inappropriately limiting or underestimating the adversary. Students did not 
adequately explore and question the motives and capabilities of the actors, 
sometimes projecting overconfidence in their answers. Students approached 
scenarios without a reflective stance, instead seeking to identify solutions 
immediately without fully considering the vulnerabilities of the systems or 
potential threats.  
These types of biases are normative and to be expected given that students 
will construct their knowledge based on prior experiences as described by our 
framing in constructivist theory. Therefore, with limited experience in a 
discipline, students will often rely on attempting to analogize to prior experiences 
or to rely on patterns of reasoning that worked in prior contexts. Notably, shallow 
approaches to problem solving are common among novices across many 
disciplines. Novices frequently employ means-end analysis while solving 
problems, attempting to find the shortest path from a problem statement to a 
desired solution. For example, if a student is asked to find the position of a 
particle given its velocity, the student might pull up an equation sheet looking for 
equations that contain variables for position and velocity rather than identify the 
concepts (e.g., conservation of momentum) that inform the solution process. 
Alignment of Findings with Prior Work 
Our findings provide evidence of fragility or context-dependence in student 
knowledge/beliefs. For example, in the context of the online shopping site, a 
student explicitly stated they did not want to trust the end user in the design. They 
used this concept as the basis of describing a design that would prevent an SQL 
injection attack, which was an appropriate design for the scenario. In contrast, in 
the next scenario, the same student implicitly trusted the user while describing 
how to design a connected private and public network by having the system 
depend on the user’s compliance to the policy. When the interviewer addressed 
the notion of not trusting the user, the student defended the proposed design, 
stating that it will deter the user because the user could face criminal charges. 
While the student had some understanding that a security engineer should design 
a system that prevents malicious attacks, even from the user, they applied this 
knowledge only in specific contexts.  
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Robustness of Findings Across Institutions 
We observed some differences in how students from the various institutions 
responded. For example, students at community college tended to propose solving 
cybersecurity problems by applying specific corporate products rather than 
describing generic solutions. Students pursuing M.S. degrees tended to project 
more self-confidence in their answers than did their undergraduate counterparts, 
regardless of the quality of their responses.  We did not observe differences in 
misconceptions across the three schools. 
As we had expected, analyzing 25 interview transcripts was a significant 
amount of work. 
Overall, our results suggest that students do not adequately comprehend core 
concepts in cybersecurity. The misconceptions themes (over generalizations, 
conflated concepts, biases, and inappropriate assumptions or solutions) suggest 
that students use a form of “satisficing” in their reasoning (Brown, 2004), 
becoming too easily satisfied that a system is secure after identifying only one 
possible source of security rather than seeking to explore the adversarial space 
more thoroughly.  
Implications, Open Problems, and Future Research 
The misconceptions we uncovered can be viewed as aspects of two central 
problems: they lack a useful framework around which to organize their thoughts 
and they do not comprehend the complexity of cybersecurity challenges. Based on 
these findings, we offer tentative suggestions for how these findings may be 
applied to the classroom and suggest future research that could validate or 
challenge these suggestions. 
To address the first challenge, we posit that adversarial thinking may be a 
useful framework to help students organize their knowledge. If true, all 
cybersecurity learning activities should require students to think deeply about 
their adversary as well as about potential ways to counter that adversary.   
To address the second challenge, we suggest using teaching methods that are 
designed to engage students in complex scenarios. Model Eliciting Activities 
(MEAs) and case studies are two such teaching methods documented in the 
research literature.  We draw upon the research literature further to suggest why 
MEAs and case studies may be helpful and how to employ them in the classroom 
effectively.  
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Summary of MEAs and Case Studies 
We recommend that instructors embrace complexity and seek to engage students 
in scenarios that require adversarial reflections and careful distinctions between 
core concepts. Beginning instruction with complexity is counter-intuitive to many 
instructors as science instruction frequently employs simplifying assumptions 
(e.g., frictionless environments in physics or teaching mathematical equations 
before introducing word problems). However, teaching techniques that embrace 
complexity can help students learn fundamental concepts and better understand 
the limits of when concepts apply.  
In MEAs, instructors give students real world datasets that include 
information that may not lead to simple perfect mathematical solutions 
(Zawojewski, Diefes-Dux, & Bowman, 2008). Students must determine how to 
extract information from these datasets to create mathematical models (e.g., 
compute averages, perform regressions to model the data) that can inform 
decisions based on the data or aid in interpretation (Bostic, 2013). Because the 
data are complicated, students must make reflective decisions about the 
appropriateness of different models. For example, students need to decide which 
measure of central tendency (e.g., mean, median, mode) is most appropriate, 
requiring students to develop conceptual distinctions between these measures 
(Bostic, 2013).  
A similar approach may help students develop conceptual distinctions 
between concepts such as confidentiality and integrity. The emphasis in grading 
should be not on the numerical correctness of answers but on the reasoning 
behind the chosen model. Similarly, cybersecurity instruction may benefit from 
engaging students in complex scenarios that do not have clear “best” solutions. 
Students would need to engage in creating models of their adversaries and their 
systems that justify those solutions. 
Case studies, like MEAs, embrace complexity by designing instruction around 
real-world scenarios that often lack a single clear right answer (Davis & Yadav, 
2014). Cases are constructed by carefully documenting facts about instructive 
real-world examples (Davis & Yadav, 2014) such as security breaches or 
documentation of existing security plans. The instructor provides supporting 
lecture content that students need to understand the case, but students are 
responsible for carrying out their own tasks (Henderson, Bellman, & Furman, 
1983). These tasks could include explaining failures or successes of security plans 
in cases, devising attacks against a plan, or devising defenses against a known 
adversary. Cases are often viewed as the best way to help students understand the 
complexity of topics in business and law, but are relatively unexplored in 
engineering and computer science topics (Davis & Yadav, 2014). These types of 
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approaches generally improve students’ ability to monitor their own learning and 
may help students learn concepts better too (Gallucci, 2006; Yadav, Shaver, & 
Meckl, 2010). 
Suggestions for Designing Complex, Yet Tractable Instruction 
It is important for students to comprehend the complexity of cybersecurity issues, 
yet immersing students in unrestricted cybersecurity scenarios can be excessively 
challenging.  To address this conflict, we suggest that it can be useful to find ways 
to instantiate core concepts in more limited contexts, to ground thinking, while 
still enabling students to experience the full range of concepts.  An example of 
this approach is to use the slightly more limited context of cryptography and 
communications security for introducing core concepts, including the CIA triad 
and authentication, while maintaining a strong emphasis on adversarial thinking.  
From such an anchor, students can then build off complexity for more general 
cybersecurity challenges. 
Understanding one core concept can help students learn other related concepts 
more accurately and faster than if they had misconceptions about that one core 
concept. For example, teaching students about the idea of emergent processes 
(discernable macro-level phenomena that occur through the uncoordinated actions 
of many independent individuals) through an example such as ants marching in a 
line can help those same students learn about other emergent processes such as 
diffusion (Slotta & Chi, 2006). 
The example of using cryptography for this approach is attractive because of 
the pervasive misconceptions we observed about cryptography and the pivotal 
nature of its core concepts. In our study, 17 of the 25 students exhibited 
misconceptions about cryptography, while most of the other students did not 
describe cryptography in sufficient detail in their interviews. We categorized most 
of these misconceptions as overgeneralizations.  
When using the example approach of cryptography, care must be taken to 
promote awareness that cybersecurity is more than cryptography.  For example, 
there are many potential ways to defeat a cryptographic communications system 
without breaking any cryptographic operation. Malware on a host computer might 
leak private keys and messages without breaking any cipher. Discussing such 
potential vulnerabilities provides important learning moments to help students 
appreciate the complexity of cybersecurity. 
Open Problems 
Our work motivates additional research into understanding cognitive patterns 
students develop while learning cybersecurity.  For example, it would be 
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interesting and useful to explore cybersecurity, cryptography, and student fragility 
in thinking.  Also, it would be interesting to study the causes of the observed 
misconceptions. 
It remains an open problem how educators can apply our findings to develop 
more effective and efficient strategies for teaching and learning cybersecurity.  It 
might be interesting to explore what computer textual analysis of our interview 
transcripts may reveal. 
Future Research  
We are using our findings to develop two educational cybersecurity assessment 
tools: the Cybersecurity Concept Inventory (CCI), and the Cybersecurity 
Curriculum Assessment (CCA).  The CCI measures conceptual understanding of 
students completing a first course in cybersecurity, and the CCA assesses how 
well a college cybersecurity curriculum prepares grades for a career in 
cybersecurity.  In particular, we base incorrect choices in multiple-choice 
assessment items in the CCI on misconceptions uncovered in this study. 
Our next steps are to validate the draft CCI with expert review, cognitive 
interviews, and psychometric testing.  We also plan to apply the CCI to identify 
and assess effective ways to teach and learn cybersecurity. 
CONCLUSION 
Using novice-led paired thematic analysis, we analyzed 25 student interviews of 
cybersecurity students to document student misconceptions and problematic 
reasoning. Four themes emerged: over generalizations, conflated concepts, biases, 
and incorrect assumptions. Furthermore, while reasoning about the cybersecurity 
scenarios presented to them, most students failed to comprehend the complexity 
and subtlety of possible vulnerabilities, threats, risks, and mitigations.  Our work 
is the first formal study of student misconceptions about cybersecurity. 
We carried out this study as part of our Cybersecurity Assessment Tools 
(CATS) project, which is developing educational assessments including a 
Cybersecurity Concept Inventory (CCI) to assess student understanding of core 
concepts in cybersecurity.  We plan to apply the CCI to identify and compare 
effective ways to teach and learn cybersecurity.  Our study of student 
misconceptions can help shape cybersecurity content, assessment, and pedagogy 
to improve student learning.   
Our work will be useful in developing curricula, educational techniques and 
materials for cybersecurity. Knowledge of student misconceptions can lead to 
strategies addressing and possibly avoiding them. While it was not the purpose of 
23
Thompson et al.: Student Misconceptions about Cybersecurity Concepts
Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2018
 
 
this study to suggest specific teaching strategies, our findings support the 
conclusion that students should learn cybersecurity in a way that encourages them 
to recognize and appreciate its considerable complexity.  Case study is one 
approach that can achieve this goal.  Our companion paper (Sherman et al., 
2017b), which answers six of the interview prompts, provides material that can be 
used in case studies and other learning activities. We encourage educators to 
consider the misconceptions identified in our study to develop and refine more 
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Appendix A: Twelve Interview Scenarios 
 
This appendix gives our twelve interview prompts.  Table 2 shows how we 
organized these prompts into three protocols, each comprising four scenarios.   
We hope that educators will find these scenarios useful for a variety of learning 
activities. 
Scenario Alpha Bravo Charlie 
1 package delivery by drones client-database design lost luggage 
2 file transfer online shopping precinct voting 
3 database input error protecting trade secrets two-channel authentication 
4 private network design Nuclear Test Ban Treaty exfiltrating a USB stick 
Table 2.  The 12 interview scenarios organized into three protocols Alpha, Bravo, and 
Charlie. 
PROTOCOL ALPHA 
Scenario 1: Package Delivery by Drones  
Consider how a company might deliver packages by drones. As a security 
engineer for the company, what threats can you identify? 
Scenario 2: File Transfer 
Alice and Bob want to share a file over the Internet.  What are some of the 
cybersecurity issues that may arise?  Sketch a diagram to help explain your 
answer. 
Scenario 3: Database Input Error 
When a user Mike O’Brien registered a new account for an online shopping site, 
he was required to provide his username, address, first and last name. 
Immediately after Mike submitted his request, you—as the security engineer—
receive a database input error message in the logs. What might you infer from this 
error message? 
Scenario 4: Private Network Design 
Bob wants you to design a secure network that allows him to have a segment on 
the public Internet and a private segment with no public access.  Traffic must also 
be able to be taken from the public segment to the private segment, but no data 
must ever go from private to public. As the security architect sketch a design that 
meets Bob's requirements. 
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Scenario 1: Client-Database Design 
Sketch a diagram that illustrates a secure communication between a customer and 
a database. 
Scenario 2: Online Shopping 
While Mary is traveling, she decides to do some shopping online.  She is 
connecting from a computer in a hotel business office. What are some of the 
cyber security issues that might arise?  Sketch a figure to illustrate your 
explanation. 
Scenario 3: Protecting Trade Secrets 
There is a server that holds a company’s trade secrets.   As the chief security 
officer devise a comprehensive security strategy to protect these trade secrets 
from corporate enemies. 
Scenario 4: Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
To comply with the terms of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Country A would like 
to implant a seismic sensor under Country B’s soil to monitor underground 
weapons testing.  Country A fears that B will try to falsify the signals of the 
sensor, and Country B fears that A will try to exfiltrate spy information embedded 
in the seismic data.  Neither party trusts the other. Requirements of the system 
include each of the following: 
1. Country A wants assurance that the seismic data it receives came from its 
sensor and were not modified. 
2. Country B wants to be able to monitor the signals transmitted from the sensor 
in real time. It too wants assurance that the signals were not modified. 
3. The design should be fair to both parties.   
How would you design a system that complies with these requirements? Draw 
a sketch to illustrate your design. 
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Scenario 1: Lost Luggage 
Bob's manager Alice is traveling abroad to give a sales presentation. Bob receives 
an email with the following message: “Bob, I just arrived and the airline lost my 
luggage. Would you please send me the technical specifications for our new 
product? Thanks, Alice.” What should Bob do? 
Scenario 2: Precinct Voting 
A security company is designing a precinct voting system for military voters 
overseas.  The system must provide voter authentication, ballot confidentiality, 
integrity of marked ballots during transportation, and assured operations.  How 
would you design such a system? 
Scenario 3: Two-Channel Authentication 
Alice is logging onto a server.  She sends her username and password over the 
Internet.  The server instructs the security computer to send a challenge to Alice's 
cell phone. For example, the challenge is the name of Alice’s pet, and the 
response is ‘Skippy’. If the security computer deems the response is valid, then 
the security computer signals the server to accept Alice’s login.  Comment on the 
security of this system. 
Scenario 4: Exfiltrating A USB Stick 
Alice works in a top-secret government facility where she has hidden a USB 
memory stick, with critical information, under a floor tile in her workspace. 
Starting from outside the fence of the building, how would you, as a penetration 
tester, retrieve the USB stick? 
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